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 1 
Obergefell and the “New” Reproduction 
Courtney Megan Cahill†  
Alternative reproduction has become the new frontier in 
the continuing culture wars over the family. Commentators 
with longstanding anxieties over non-traditional kinship have 
turned their regulatory gaze to it, as have more progressive 
scholars who support non-traditional family formation but nev-
ertheless favor proposals to regulate the “new kinship” and the 
“new reproduction.”1 Excavating Obergefell v. Hodges’s2 less ob-
vious reproductive dimension, this Essay argues that the 
Court’s landmark marriage equality decision renders these 
regulatory proposals of alternative procreation constitutionally 
vulnerable. It further maintains that Obergefell could trans-
form even existing laws on procreation by eroding a distinction 
on which so many of them rest: the distinction between sexual 
and alternative life creation. Thus understood, Obergefell is a 
case that unsettles not just the traditional underpinnings of 
marriage, but also the very edifice supporting the legal regula-
tion of intimate and family life.  
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth commenta-
tors’ proposed regulations of alternative reproduction and their 
 
†  Copyright © 2016 by Courtney Megan Cahill. 
 1. Naomi Cahn refers to the families created by alternative reproduction 
as “the new kinship.” See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367 
(2012) [hereinafter The New Kinship]. Dorothy Roberts refers to some alterna-
tive reproductive methods as “the new reproduction.” Dorothy E. Roberts, Race 
and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS. L.J. 935 (1996). While some alterna-
tive reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, are relatively new, 
others, such as surrogacy and alternative insemination, have a much longer 
ancestry—one that in some cases extends back to biblical times. See generally 
KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK, 
AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 200–25 (2014) (providing a detailed history 
of insemination with donor sperm in the 19th and early-to-mid 20th centu-
ries); Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close 
Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1107 (2002) 
(“Surrogacy by natural means . . . was practiced since biblical times.”). This 
author places “new” in smart quotes in order to contest what is routinely as-
sumed, namely, the novelty of alternative reproduction and the kinship that it 
helps to create.  
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
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justifications for them. Part II considers the fate of those pro-
posals after Obergefell v. Hodges, which destabilizes both tradi-
tionalist and non-traditionalist justifications for alternative re-
productive regulation. Part III concludes.  
I.  PROPOSED REGULATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE 
REPRODUCTION   
A. REGULATORY PROPOSALS 
Calls to regulate the practices of alternative reproduction 
are sounding from diverse ideological camps and creating sur-
prising bedfellows. On the more conservative side, David 
Blankenhorn, the lead witness for Proposition 8’s supporters in 
the federal trial over that amendment’s constitutionality and a 
longtime skeptic of non-traditional kinship,3 opposes the indus-
try norm of gamete donor anonymity4 and advocates laws that 
limit sperm bank use to married heterosexual couples.5 Lynn 
Wardle and Marsha Garrison have embraced similar pro-
posals.6  
 
 3. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING 
OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 171–84 (1995) (cataloguing and discuss-
ing the perceived costs of “sperm fatherhood”); David Blankenhorn, President, 
Inst. Am. Values, The Rights of Children and the Redefinition of Parenthood 
(June 2, 2005), http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/family-humanrights.pdf. 
For recent scholarly treatment of Blankenhorn’s traditionalist project vis-à-vis 
alternative reproduction, see Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regu-
lating Family After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 191, 228 
(2015); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence 
of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 820–22 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, Mar-
riage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(on file with author).  
 4. Cf. David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http:///www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how 
-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.html. Blankenhorn concludes his New 
York Times Op-Ed by announcing his newfound support for same-sex marriage 
and pressing individuals to reconsider whether they ought to be “denying” 
children born of assisted reproductive means the right to biological 
parenthood. See id.  This same argument emerged in Blankenhorn’s testimony 
against same-sex marriage in the Proposition 8 trial, where he testified that 
children have a right to “know and be known by the two people who brought 
[them] into this world.” Transcript of Proceedings, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW). Remarks like these suggest 
that alternative reproduction has become the new resting place for 
Blankenhorn’s (and his Institute’s) anxiety over unconventional kinship.  
 5. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 233.  
 6. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive 
Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 
905–10 (2000); Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Par-
entage by Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 453 (2006).  
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Conservative commentators are not alone in turning their 
regulatory eye to alternative reproduction, as progressive com-
mentators who otherwise support alternative family formation 
advocate stricter regulation of alternative reproduction. Naomi 
Cahn, for instance, supports laws that eliminate donor ano-
nymity,7 place caps on the number of children born from any 
individual donor,8 and establish “special birth certificates for  
. . . donor conceived children.”9 Dov Fox advances the regulation 
of a different industry norm: donor banks’ arrangement of do-
nors in race salient ways.10 He supports taxing banks that do 
so,11 or subjecting them to a commercial advertising ban.12 Fi-
nally, Michele Goodwin supports the private regulation of al-
ternative reproduction through the application of tort law to its 
routine practices.13 Tort law, she argues, ought to regulate 
“reckless [alternative] reproduction” no less than it regulates 
“reckless driving.”14  
These regulatory proposals depart from the status quo, 
which reflects a largely non-interventionist approach toward 
alternative reproduction;15 indeed, some of them would alter its 
practice in dramatic ways that are likely to have a disparate 
impact on historically marginalized groups, like sexual minori-
ties.16 In addition, these proposals represent the position that 
today dominates academic commentary on alternative repro-
duction. While some scholars resist the call to regulate alterna-
 
 7. See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR-
CONCEIVED FAMILIES 129 (2012); The New Kinship, supra note 1, at 413; Na-
omi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor 
Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203, 223 (2009).  
 8. See The New Kinship, supra note 1, at 412. 
 9. Naomi Cahn, Do Tell! The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1077, 1104–05 (2014); see also CAHN, supra note 7, 151 (call-
ing for such a change and explaining the legal and policy elements that sup-
port limits on a single donor sperm’s use).  
 10. See Dov Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
3 (2011); Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification and Assisted Reproduction, 118 
YALE L.J. 1844 (2009) [hereinafter Racial Classification]. 
 11. Racial Classification, supra note 10, at 1897. 
 12. Id. at 1897–98. 
 13. Michele Goodwin, A View from the Cradle: Tort Law and the Private 
Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 59 EMORY L.J. 1039 (2010). 
 14. Id. at 1054. 
 15. See CAHN, supra note 7, at 27 (stating that the fertility industry’s reg-
ulatory practices reflect “self-policing” rather than “top-down governance” (cit-
ing Steven Kotler, The God of Sperm: In an Industry Veiled in Secrecy, a Pow-
erful L.A. Sperm Peddler Shapes the Nation’s Rules on Disease, Genetics—and 
Accidental Incest, L.A. WEEKLY, Sept. 27, 2007)).  
 16. See MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND IN-
FORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES 62 (2015).  
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tive reproduction, theirs, Martha Ertman writes, is “a minority 
view.” 17  
B. REGULATORY JUSTIFICATIONS  
Some commentators support reproductive regulation for 
overtly normative reasons. Blankenhorn, for instance, contends 
that the government ought to eliminate gamete donor anonymi-
ty because children have a “right to know” their “biological par-
ents,”18 and supports limiting access to alternative insemina-
tion to married, heterosexual couples on the basis that “[i]n a 
good society, people do not traffic commercially in the produc-
tion of radically fatherless children.”19 Wardle and Garrison 
agree, arguing, respectively, that anonymous gamete donation 
is akin to a “badge” and “incident of slavery,”20 and undermines 
societal norms in favor of biological, dual-gendered 
parenthood.21  
Less conservative scholars who favor reproductive regula-
tion turn away from traditional family values rhetoric, and of-
ten center instead on the constitutional status of procreation. 
They variously contend that Skinner v. Oklahoma,22 on its face 
a case about equal protection rather than fundamental rights,23 
 
 17. Id. at 60. For other critiques of recent proposals to regulate alternative 
reproductive technologies, see Cahill, supra note 3; I. Glenn Cohen, Response: 
Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and 
One-Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431 (2012); Martha M. Ertman, Unexpected 
Links Between Baby Markets and Intergenerational Justice, 8 L. & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. 271 (2014); NeJaime, supra note 3; see also Courtney Megan Cahill, 
Reproduction Reconceived (Jan. 10, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author and the Minnesota Law Review) (arguing that the strong constitu-
tional norms in favor of unregulated sexual reproduction must apply as well to 
alternative reproduction given both the factual similarities between sexual 
and alternative procreation and emerging constitutional principles in favor of 
procreative and familial autonomy).  
 18. Blankenhorn, supra note 4. 
 19. BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 233. 
 20. Wardle, supra note 6, at 451. 
 21. See Garrison, supra note 6, at 905–06, 912. 
 22. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  
 23. Skinner held that Oklahoma’s mandatory sterilization law for particu-
lar classes of criminal offenders violated the federal Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. at 542–43. For scholars who argue that Skinner establishes a fundamental 
right to procreate notwithstanding its equal protection holding, see Ira C. 
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
981, 1019 (1979); John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, 
and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1493 
(2008) (“Although [Skinner] couched its decision in the language of equality  
. . . the rhetoric of a liberty right to reproduce . . . explains the frequency with 
which the case is now cited.”). 
2016]OBERGEFELL AND THE “NEW” REPRODUCTION 5 
 
“says little about the importance or value of reproduction or the 
right to reproduce,”24 says nothing about whether that right in-
cludes alternative reproductive technologies,25 and at most pro-
hibits the government from regulating alternative reproductive 
technologies in unequal ways—not from regulating alternative 
reproductive technologies for everyone.26 They also suggest that 
the mechanical differences between sexual and alternative re-
production justify different constitutional treatment of them, 
sometimes reasoning that “non-intimate” alternative reproduc-
tion is sufficiently distinct from “intimate” sexual reproduction 
to warrant less constitutional protection—and greater regula-
tion.27  
Unlike the more overtly traditionalist arguments put forth 
by alternative reproduction skeptics, the arguments in this lat-
ter group appear to be driven by doctrine and fact, rather than 
by dogma and ideology. Even so, they ought to trouble those 
who favor procreative and familial choice and who are wary of 
the many emerging proposals to curtail it, emanating as they 
do an air of neutrality that renders them more universally ap-
pealing—and therefore more likely to be codified as law—than 
their visibly ideological cohorts.  
II.  OBERGEFELL ON REPRODUCTION   
Obergefell destabilizes both traditionalist and non-
traditionalist arguments in favor of alternative reproductive 
regulation. Section A considers Obergefell’s impact on ideologi-
cally conservative arguments, that is, on those arguments that 
justify reproductive regulation by underscoring the importance 
of preserving the traditional nuclear family. Section B turns to 
Obergefell’s effect on the more rhetorically neutral arguments 
considered above, that is, on those arguments that justify re-
productive regulation by focusing on the constitutional status of 
procreation in general and alternative procreation in particu-
lar. 
 
 24. Goodwin, supra note 13, at 1089. 
 25. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 1, at 424; Fox, Racial Classification, supra 
note 10, at 1882; Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gy and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1461–63 (2008). 
 26. Rao, supra note 25, at 1460  (“[T]he government could prohibit use of a 
particular reproductive technology across the board for everyone; however, 
once the state permits use in some contexts, it should not be able to forbid use 
of the same technology in other contexts. Hence, all persons must possess an 
equal right, even if no one retains an absolute right, to use ARTs.”).  
 27. Cahn, supra note 9, at 1106; Goodwin, supra note 13, at 1091–92; Fox, 
Racial Classification, supra note 10, at 1882–83.  
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A. TRADITIONALIST ARGUMENTS AFTER OBERGEFELL  
The fate of arguments that favor reproductive regulation 
for patently normative reasons is clear after Obergefell: such 
arguments, and any laws they might inspire, are likely uncon-
stitutional. Obergefell acknowledges the reality of gay 
parenthood, including gay “biological” parenthood,28 and dispels 
hoary stereotypes about sexual minorities as sterile pedophili-
acs prone to unfamiliar, and unfamilial, behavior.29 In addition, 
Obergefell explicitly extends constitutional shelter to “choices 
concerning . . . family relationships, procreation, and childrear-
ing.”30 Finally, Obergefell establishes a constitutional norm of 
sexual orientation equality in marriage as well as in what it re-
fers to as the “related rights” of childrearing and procreation.31 
In all of these ways, Obergefell disrupts the traditionalist ar-
gument for reproductive regulation, motivated as that argu-
ment is by an impulse to promote, privilege, and replicate the 
conventional nuclear family and to cast sexual minorities in 
“family unfriendly” ways.  
B. LESS (OVERTLY) TRADITIONALIST ARGUMENTS AFTER  
OBERGEFELL 
Less immediately evident is the fate of arguments that fa-
vor reproductive regulation for more rhetorically neutral, pro-
creation-centered reasons. This Essay submits that Obergefell 
unsettles those arguments no less than it upends their more 
overtly ideological companions, and that it does so in three 
ways. First, Obergefell suggests that procreation is a funda-
mental right under the Due Process Clause, thus complicating 
regulatory proposals that derive from a belief that the Consti-
tution extends moderate equality protection, rather than ex-
pansive liberty protection, to procreation. Second, Obergefell 
suggests that constitutional parity exists between sexual and 
alternative reproduction not only with respect to the right to 
marry, but also with respect to the right to procreate. Third, 
 
 28. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (”[M]any same-sex 
couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biologi-
cal or adopted.”). 
 29. See id. at 2596, 2600. On these stereotypes, see Franklin, supra note 
3, at 829 (“For the better part of a century, stereotyped conceptions of homo-
sexuals (particularly gay men) depicted them as sexually predatory, dangerous 
to children, and antithetical to the family.”); Courtney Megan Cahill, The 
Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the Law’s 
Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393, 460–63 (2007). 
 30. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.  
 31. Id. at 2600. 
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Obergefell furthers a constitutional trend away from the sex 
exceptionalism that animates large swaths of the law—
including proposed and actual regulations of alternative repro-
duction. 
1. Procreation as a Fundamental Right 
Obergefell first upsets procreation-based arguments in fa-
vor of reproductive regulation by suggesting that procreation is 
a constitutionally protected liberty right. Recall the argument 
that Skinner v. Oklahoma at most establishes a principle of 
“equal liberty” in reproductive matters.32 This more restrained 
reading of Skinner avers that the Constitution prohibits the 
state from passing certain laws that curb the procreative liber-
ties of particular groups, not from passing certain laws that 
curb the procreative liberties of everyone. It posits that certain 
regulations of alternative reproduction, as long as they do not 
target specific groups, would likely pass constitutional muster. 
Obergefell renders this more modest, equality-based read-
ing of Skinner—and the regulatory regimes that could flow 
from it—problematic. Obergefell conceptualizes procreation 
much in the same way that it conceptualizes marriage: as both 
an equality and a liberty right. That it does so is unsurprising, 
given that it acknowledges more than once the inter-
connectedness of marriage and procreation, calling them “relat-
ed rights” that compose a “unified whole.”33  
Consider first Obergefell’s description of marriage. Prior 
marriage decisions either interweave equality and liberty or 
rest exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause,34 leading com-
mentators to suggest that those cases at most establish that 
the Constitution guarantees “equal access” to marriage,35 not 
that marriage is a fundamental right. Unlike those decisions, 
Obergefell is a persistent meditation on the marriage “right.” 
Obergefell refers to marriage as a form of “liberty” three times 
in just its first paragraph,36 and reiterates throughout its ma-
jority opinion that marriage is a fundamental right under the 
 
 32. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 25, at 1460. 
 33. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.  
 34. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) (finding only a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 
(1967) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
 35. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2081, 2083 (2005) (suggesting that the state could abolish marriage without 
violating due process); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and 
the Right To Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1400–07 (2010). 
 36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 Even as it 
observes the equality dimension of marriage,38 Obergefell in-
sists that “[t]he Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . set forth independent principles”39 and that “[t]he 
right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty 
promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from 
that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the 
laws.”40 The adverbial “too” suggests that, for the majority, 
marriage is protected as a matter of substantive due process as 
well as equal protection.  
Obergefell conceptualizes the constitutional status of pro-
creation in similar terms. “[I]n Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson,” Obergefell says, “the Court invalidated under both 
principles [liberty and equality] a law that allowed sterilization 
of habitual criminals.”41 Given the Obergefell majority’s delib-
erate parsing of liberty and equality as “independent princi-
ples” animating the constitutional status of marriage; given its 
allusion to Skinner as a case that, like marriage, involves 
“both” liberty and equality; and given its conceptualization of 
marriage and procreation as “related rights,” it would not be 
implausible to say that Obergefell provides an opening for what 
many scholars see lacking in Skinner: a robust articulation of 
procreation’s substantive constitutional dimension.42  
If that is correct, then Obergefell could unsettle arguments 
favoring reproductive regulation that are predicated on an 
“equal liberty” theory of procreation. In a world where procrea-
tion is not protected under substantive due process, reproduc-
tive regulation that burdens all alternative procreators is of lit-
tle constitutional moment. But in a world where procreation is 
a fundamental right, reproductive regulation that burdens any 
alternative procreator—including mandatory donor non-
anonymity regulation—raises serious constitutional concern.  
2. Constitutional Parity Between Sexual and Alternative  
Reproduction 
Obergefell unsettles procreation-based arguments in favor 
of alternative reproductive regulation for a second reason: the 
 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 2598. 
 38. See id. at 2602–05. 
 39. Id. at 2603 (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 2602 (emphasis added).  
 41. Id. at 2604 (emphasis added). 
 42. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Ge-
nomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 453–54 (2003).  
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Court suggests constitutional parity between sexual and alter-
native reproduction. Recall the argument that Skinner at most 
extends constitutional protection to traditional—that is, sexu-
al—procreation. Obergefell appears to differ. First, it overrules 
Baker v. Nelson,43 a case that rested implicitly on a constitu-
tionally relevant distinction between sexual and alternative re-
production. Second, it declares that even non-traditional prac-
tices, like certain forms of alternative reproduction, receive 
constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause.  
Binding on courts until Obergefell, Baker held that Minne-
sota’s marriage exclusion did not violate the federal Constitu-
tion because marriage was necessarily procreative. “Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the human race,” it reasoned.44 Baker’s procreation ra-
tionale, which became authority for courts hearing marriage 
claims for the next three decades,45 did not just link marriage 
and procreation, however: it linked marriage and sexual pro-
creation in particular—albeit without explicitly saying so. 
When Baker was decided in 1971, the public was well aware of 
the practice of alternative insemination, which had become not 
only “popular” by the 1940s,46 but also legal in some states.47 
Courts and legislators in several states, including Minnesota, 
had been wrestling with issues surrounding alternative insem-
ination for years before Baker was decided in 1971,48 and by 
1973 the Uniform Law Commissioners had codified the trend 
toward legalization of alternative insemination through the 
passage of an act that legitimized alternative reproduction: the 
Uniform Parentage Act.49 By the 1980s, as courts were continu-
 
 43. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).  
 44. Id. at 186 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942)).  
 45. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wa. Ct. App. 1974) 
(quoting Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186).  
 46. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1060.  
 47. See id. at 1083–97. 
 48. See id. at 1069 n.125. 
 49. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1973), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/ 
upa73.pdf (stating that a male donor will not be considered a father of a child 
born from alternative insemination if the sperm is provided to a licensed phy-
sician for use in alternative insemination of a married woman other than the 
donor’s wife). The Uniform Parentage Act was revised in 2000 (and amended 
in 2002). Parentage Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www 
.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Jan. 
4, 2016). Among other things, the revised UPA dispenses with the physician 
assistance and marriage requirements. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002), http://www 
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ing to justify same-sex marriage exclusions by adverting to pro-
creation,50 the commercial gamete market began to cater to les-
bian women in particular, with the country’s first lesbian-
owned sperm bank, Pacific Reproductive Services, opening for 
business in California in 1984.51  
By upholding marriage exclusions on the basis of procrea-
tion at a time when increasing numbers of sexual minorities 
were procreating, Baker and its progeny signaled that marriage 
was not just about procreation generally, but about sexual pro-
creation specifically. In fact, every iteration of the procreation 
rationale, from Baker’s “perpetuation of the species” rationale 
to the more recent “responsible procreation” rationale rejected 
by the Obergefell majority,52 assumed that the state could deny 
same-sex couples the right to marry because of their inability to 
procreate in a certain manner—sexually—not because of their 
inability to procreate at all.  
Obergefell reverses that trend by (1) rejecting all versions 
of the procreation rationale,53 (2) recognizing the non-
traditional kinship often made possible by alternative repro-
duction54 and citing it as a reason to extend marriage to same-
sex couples,55 and (3) overruling Baker: “Baker v. Nelson must 
be and now is overruled,” it declares.56 In all of these ways, 
Obergefell renders procreative mechanics irrelevant with re-
spect to the right to marry.  
Even more, Obergefell renders procreative mechanics irrel-
evant with respect to the right to procreate. Obergefell states 
that non-traditional practices, like same-sex marriage, may 
qualify for fundamental right status under the Due Process 
Clause, notwithstanding the Court’s earlier insistence in Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg that “the [Due Process] Clause specially 
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, ob-
 
.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf.    
 50. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) 
(finding Baker to be persuasive). 
 51. See Why a Lesbian-Owned Bank Is a Positive Choice for Any Woman, 
PAC. REPROD. SERVS., https://www.pacrepro.com/index.php?main_page=why_ 
prs (last visited Jan. 4, 2016). For a complete history of sperm banks’ opera-
tion in the United States, see SWANSON, supra note 1, at 198–237.  
 52. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).  
 53. See id. at 2601 (rejecting perpetuation of the species rationale); id. at 
2607 (rejecting responsible procreation rationale).  
 54. See id. at 2600. 
 55. See id. at 2600–01. 
 56. Id. at 2605. 
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jectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”57 
In rejecting the Glucksberg approach—at least with respect to 
some fundamental rights, including “marriage and intima-
cy”58—and in refusing to define rights “by who exercised them 
in the past,”59 Obergefell lays the foundation for establishing 
complete constitutional parity between (traditional) sexual re-
production and (non-traditional) alternative reproduction—
parity, that is, with respect not just to marriage but to procrea-
tion also. If marriage and procreation are “related rights,” as 
Obergefell insists,60 and if the traditional approach for deter-
mining rights under the Due Process Clause does not apply to 
marriage, then it follows that the traditional approach for de-
termining rights probably does not apply to procreation either. 
3. The Demise of Sex Exceptionalism  
Obergefell unsettles procreation-based arguments in favor 
of alternative reproductive regulation for a third reason: by fur-
thering a constitutional trend away from sex exceptionalism. 
Defined as the idea that the uniqueness of sex warrants differ-
ent, and often privileged, legal treatment of it, sex 
exceptionalism pervades legal doctrine, from the regulation of 
intimate agreements to the punishment of sex work, sexual as-
sault, and sexual offenders.61 Sex exceptionalism influenced 
constitutional marriage law until Obergefell, and continues to 
influence proposed—and actual—regulations of alternative re-
production.62  
The devolution of sex exceptionalism that arguably started 
with Lawrence v. Texas63—a case that functions as Obergefell’s 
 
 57. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).  
 58. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“[W]hile [the Glucksberg] approach may 
have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted 
suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing 
other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”).  
 59. Id. at 2602 (“If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, 
then received practices could serve as their own continued justification and 
new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”); see also id. at 2597 
(“History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry [of identifying funda-
mental rights] but do not set its outer boundaries. . . . That method respects 
our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the pre-
sent.”).  
 60. Id. at 2600.  
 61. For an examination of sex exceptionalism in these and other domains, 
see Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303 (2014).  
 62. See generally Laura A Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and 
Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809 (2010) (identifying and questioning the 
law’s idealization of certain sexual relations).  
 63. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
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veritable “ur-text”64—continues apace in Obergefell. Lawrence 
established that heterosexual intercourse is not the sine qua 
non of sexual autonomy. Obergefell establishes that heterosex-
ual intercourse is not the sine qua non of marital autonomy—
nor, arguably, of procreative autonomy. At the very least, Law-
rence and Obergefell challenge justifications for reproductive 
regulation that are grounded on alleged differences between 
“intimate” heterosexual reproduction and “non-intimate” alter-
native reproduction.65 At their most radical, they decenter the 
privileged status that heterosexual intercourse has long en-
joyed in the law, and destabilize the panoply of existing re-
gimes that embrace sex exceptionalism. Such regimes include, 
among others, federal regulations of gamete banks and state 
paternity laws, both of which create a separate set of rules for 
sexual and alternative procreators.66 
  CONCLUSION: OBERGEFELL’S TRANSFORMATIVE 
POTENTIAL   
Obergefell is a marriage case whose animating logic ex-
tends beyond marriage, and into realms like procreation and 
the family. It poses an obstacle to the many emerging proposals 
to regulate alternative reproduction, and throws into question 
myriad existing laws that are predicated on a factual and legal 
distinction between sexual and alternative reproduction. View-
ing Obergefell, a case that is sure to be celebrated principally in 
terms of marriage and gay rights, in the more capacious terms 
suggested by this Essay helps to uncover the radical, and truly 
transformative, power that it holds.  
 
 64. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“The generations that wrote 
and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not pre-
sume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions.”) with Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 575 (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components 
of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. 
They did not presume to have this insight.”).  
 65. See supra note 27. 
 66. The Food and Drug Administration burdens non-sexual gamete dona-
tion, but not sexual gamete donation, with costly testing requirements. See, 
e.g., Amber D. Abbasi, The Curious Case of Trent Arsenault: Questioning FDA 
Regulatory Authority over Private Sperm Donation, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 
16 (2013). In addition, the law in every state that has addressed the legal sta-
tus of sperm donors makes a distinction between sexual and alternative re-
production in the laws of parentage. See Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity 
and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 701 (2008); Katharine 
K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law 
and Paternal Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22–23 (2004).   
